Is the Feminist Critique of Reason Rational?
Lind a Marcin Akoff I would wager thac many women in philosophy understand inruitively chat there i s a natur al link berween fe minism and philosophy.1 Michele LeDoeuff ex plains this as fol 1ows. To be a fe minise, she claims, is tO be "a woman who does not leave others to think for her. .. "2 This is the essential core of the fe minist attitude, prior to the acceptance of any specific fe minist theory or explanation of women's subordination. But on the basi s of just this minimal core, LeDoeuff conjectures we can "make a link" between feminism and philosophy, building on the more general link between "chinking philosophically and self-assertion through thought." Given this assoc iation between the doing of philosophy and a certain kind of assertive subjectivity, or between philosophy's being and doing, it becomes clear that "'thinking philosophically' and 'being a fe mini st' appear as one and the same attitude: a desire to judge by and for oneself!'J However, despite this "natural" connection, withi n the profession at large th� attribution of an intrinsic connection between fe minism andl philosophy more often produces cognitive dissonance. Feminism is (considered) a substantive set of empirical claims and political commitments. Philosophy is (considered) a discipline of thought organized by the pursuit of truth but uncommitted to any particular truth. To forego this separation by committing philosophy ir.self co some particular truth before it even begins its work is to risk inviting dogmatism. Therefore , philosophical reason must be kept prior co and primary over femini sm. else feminism icself will be doomed to irracionalicy.
Or so Martha Nussbaum has argued in a recent critique of feminist philosophy which appeared in The New Yark Review of Books. The flavor of this arrt:icle is anticipated in her opening epigram from Plato which states that there must ube a type of woman that loves philosophy, and another type that hates it."4 For Nussbaum, as well as for Plato, the deciding issue demarcating these "types of women" is their respect for and loyalty to reason. This is the main problem she has with much fe minist philosophy: that it courts irrationalism by unreasonably associating patriarchy with philosophical reason and thus undermining what should be its own best ally in the effort to critique and counteract irrational sexist beliefs. In this paper I will try to allay these concerns, some of which arise from an equivocation over the word "reason ," or a disagreement about its scope, a topic I will discuss in a moment. But I also want to place Nussbaum's specific (and legitimate) questions within a larger context involving philosophy's own legitimation narratives and its resistance to feminism, especially to fe minist philosophy. This resistance has reached a discernible new stage in the level of attentive interrogation the mainstream is directing toward our work. We have been interrogated before, but mos tly we have been ignored, puzzled over, chided, and sometimes ridiculed. The major re search departments have by and large not included feminist philosophy in their course liscs, much less their required courses or compre hensive exam areas. We are by and large not cited or quoted by the leading (or dominant) writers in the discipline, even when our ideas are relevant to and supportive of theirs. There are too many examples here to cite.
(An especially stark example is Steve Fuller's 1988 Social Epistemology which foc used on central themes feminists had worked on throughout the l 980's but neglected to cite a single fe minist work. 5) After Annette Baier's ground breaking presidential address to the AP A a few years back, gro und breaking as the first address which developed fe minist themes, the (male) philosophers chat surrounded me in the audience were universally cold in their assessment, one of them expressing the general reaction : "Nice paper, but Linda Martin Alcaff no argument." ThlS, as we all know, lS the most devastatmg cnnci.sm a philosopher can make of another.
Still, Annette Baier did become pres1denc of the APA. and she did read a paper developing fe minist themes. Richard Rorry, a widelv read philosopher despite hLS iconoclasm, has recencly been quoting Marilyn Frye with approval. There are regular panels on fe minisl philosophy at each of the APA divtS 1 on meetings.
Several journals have had special issues on feminism, and have reviewed fe minise boo b.
And though we are not at the ma1or research institutions yec, fe minist phllosophers are gening jobs, in some cases good ones.
These positive developments are causing anxiety in a variery of quarters. Some white male· job candidates feel threatened, and surprised that they would be threatened (I th.in1'), in a discipline they chink of as ruled by reason rather than "political correctness."
Even established philosophers may feel some anxiety about what our agenda is in the profession, and to what extent it is directed at them. And the anxiety is noc restricted to men: perhaps feminism poses a greater immediate risk to women in the fie ld. Senior women .who work in fairly traditional areas may fe el as if they are being implicitly criticized by this new area of work, e.g., that their work is not fe minise enough or is the prod ucc of internalized oppression. In a conrexc where few if any women in our profession fe el completely accepted by the discipline, a fe minist presence can create cause for alarm:
alarm about the projected guilt by association, or irritation at claims made about one that one has no sympathy for, or fe ar chat the derision off eminist work wU l cast a general dou be about women's ability to philosophize. I have experienced this myself. I was recently at a conference where another woman and I made a minority of two on a panel which included ten male speakers. After several hours of presentations and discussion, a woman from the audience spoke up, rather heatedly, to chastise the men for not listening co me and the other woman, for not even "looking at us as we spoke." I felt patemalized by thi s intervention, annoyed by what I believed was an overhasty judgment-call and the face that she hadn't approached us directly before speaking on our behalf in public.
At the same time as I would critique some of the particular fe atures of this small example of 11feminist intervention," I also know that my miffed reaction was partly due to my own embarrassment: I wanted to pretend that everythi ng at the conference was fine, that my work was being given equal and fair considerati on, and that the male colleagues with whom I was working were trustworthy and impartial. It would be personally painful to think otherwise, and awkward and difficult to raise such criticisms publicly. So part of my reaction to this speaker from the audience was also based on a resistance against the possibility that she was right. Reactions to feminism often harbor both these sorts of elements-legitimate criticism alongside anxiety-driven resistance-without their being distinguished. We need to initiate some collective processes of group self-re flection in order to better identify whi ch reaction is which. And we must realize that it would be foo lish co aim toward the elimination of all anxious resistance against the immense (yet also very personal} social changes and disciplinary evolutions that feminism has initiated. On the other hand, clearly it would be wrong to demand that feminist philosophers must somehow take responsibility for these anxieties, that we must reassure the boys that we are not anti male, that we aren't out to destroy the canon, or that we must stop analyzing gender so
as not to make it look like women are only interested in the particular and never the universal, or even that we should stop calling our.selves feminists so that people won 't confuse the whole of feminism with what we write. There are things that we should take 3
Is the Feminise Critique of Reason Rational! respons ibility for, of course, and uppermost among these I would put the quality of our work, our intelleccual integrity and political accountability, and our responsibility to use any power we have co help other women in the profession overcome sexist obstacles to cheir development as philosophers (a motivation that, no doubt, inspired the woman I mentioned above). How we rinterpret these responsibilicies-how,e.g., we define "quality," and how we identify where responsibility devolves into paternalism-i s of course subject to a debate which will never achieve fi nal resolution. Feminist philosophy provokes panicularly anxious responses because its subject matter is not the ontological status of numbers or of mereological sums but the status of women, with necessarily implicit if not explicit judgments concerning how we have lived and how we should live in our private as well as public lives. It thus exposes nerves and challenges our constructions of self. And for women who are philosophers, that construction of self has no doubt incorporated to a significant degree some notions about our individual and perhaps collective capacity to reason, to wield that most important human capacity and to participate in the ongoing conversation guided by reason which we call philosophical thought. It is thus in the midst of these complicated and treacherous waters chat we must consider the debate over the feminist critique of reason. Sabina Lovibond has written another, perhaps more judicious essay on fe minism and reason but which articulates some of the same concerns as Martha Nus.sbaum's essay.6 Boch Nussbaum and Lovibond are concerned with fe minise philosophy's relationship to philosophy, co the canon, and to the standard understandings of reason, argument, or what might be thought of as epistemic legitimation within the field. Both question whether feminism rightly criticizes the canon as fundamentally patriarchal, and they wonder if fe minism can coherently critique philosophical methodology given that it must use that same methodology in its critique. And both are concerned that a feminist critique of philosophy and of reason may well undercut one of the primary strategies women have at our disposal to invalidate sexist beliefs.
These are important and legitimate concerns, since they raise the key metaphilosophical challenges that fe minise philosophy has put forward co the discipline. In particular, the fe minist critique of reason challenges philosophy's self-understanding as a discipline of discourse primarily organized by the pursuit of truth (unlike, for example, literature, theology, rhetoric , or art). And key to this self-image is Plato's distinction between philosophy and sophistry, between philosophical argument governed by the pursuit of truth and rhetorical argument governed by the pursuit of persuasion or practical aims. Given this map, the demi se o{ philosophical reason would seem to consign us to accepting that all discourses are reducible to strategies of power or manifestations of a desire ungoverned by rational standards.
But if philosophy is truly truth-seeking, then how can we account for the exclusion, denigration, and repudiation of all things female throughout the history of our esteemed vocation? When Aristotle explains that women are deformed males, when Rousseau advises to consult women's opinions only in bodily matters and never in matters of morality or understanding, when Kant jokes that a woman who reasons might as well have a beard, and when Hegel likens the differences between males and fe males to those between animals and plants, where is the overriding concern with truth?7 Can the pattern discernible in these errors be explained as the result of an ignorance of some empirical fact? If the problem is a moral one, isn't it likely that the tradition of moral theory produced by these thinkers would show some trace of their ability to hold these attitudes towards their closest companions ? And to the ex cent chat the moral disposition 4
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The traditional account of sexism Vvithin philosophy has be.en thac H manifests only temporary lapses of reasoning abilicy, �d on whac Nussbaum calls .. blind spocs, the ignora nce of fac t, and the moral obtuseness" of a male,dominated academy. On her view, we can rectify these errors by gertmg on .. with the cough work of theorizing in a rigorous and thoroughgoing way" on philosophical issues concerning women, sex, and the fa mily. "Ir is in this way and no other," Nussbaum claims, "char women in philosophy can go beyond the past achievements of males. '09 Reason will reveal the truth, if it is wielded consistently and rigorously.
But as I have suggested, many feminist philosophers have argued that thi s move is premature. The first response to a survey of the "blind spots" on women in the canon should nor be si mply new work on women using previous methods but must be a self, reflective, sel),critical one, on the pan of philosophy itself, in order to answer how it could be the case that, as LeDoeuff puts it, "where women are concerned the learned utter, and institutions let them utter, words which fall clearly below their own usual standards of validation. " 1 0 How does this licensing of misogyny operate within canonical texts? What standards of validation permit the opportunist devolution of the usual standards when the subject is women?
Nussbaum has rwo worries abouc chi s move coward criciquing reason: (a) she worries that critiquing reason leads feminists to dispense with reason and thus toward an irrationalism that would reli nquish the possibility of truth (a philosophical concern) ; (b) she also worries that without reason feminism will not be able to justify the feminist conclusions that she herself would suppon, and thus that fe minism's political aims will be disabled {a political concern). My argument will be that these are legitimate but groundless concerns.
Clearly one difficulty here concerns just exactly what is being talked about when we talk about reason. Nussbaum generally uses a very limited and narrow account of reason, involving no more than giving arguments and subjecting these to tests oflogical validity. I could say here, correctly, that no feminist philosopher would dispute the need for reason in chis minimal version, but there is more to the story. Feminists who are engaged in the critique of reason generally understand reason as involving more than logical validity to include conceptions of intellectual virtue, certain kinds of mental dispositions, and a variety of semi,conscious assumptions that work to identify what can count as an argument as well as what can count as relevant reasons toward its conclusion. For some contemporary philosophers, this larger notion of reason brings to mind tired Moderni st debates over the quest for a faculty of reason which are today considered thankfully closed. On this view, the feminist critique would be essentially targetting a straw figu re, or returning us to an outmoded project few continue to be interested in pursuing.
However, the feminist critique of reason is not obsessing over an outdated conception of reason but revealing the implicit assumptions still operatilve in even the minimal conception of reason endorsed today. In other words, the idea of a radical break (or incommensurable paradigm shift) between Modernist concepts of Reason and modem accounts of reason is both implausible and in fact mistaken. The very endorsement of minimalism, which has been a vogue in both epistemology and metaphysics at least since Quine, bespeaks a host of philosophical assumptions and a specific metaphilosophical orientation. For one thing, minimalism allows philosophers to beli eve they can transcend the quagmires of the Modernist debates with a simple change in defin ition, and avoid self, 5 refl�ction over how those earlier assumptions were implicated in sexism and how they still inform current thinking. le is chis very refusal to engage in self-reflection over the political problems in chose earlier accounts that "'ill doom us to be repeatedly susceptible ro the same sort of errors.
In order to adequately assess the fe minist critique, then, a stubborn insi scence thac all chere is to reason is given in the miminal account will just get in the way. For the mome nt, let us define reason more broa dly, and also more generally, as the conception of how we achieve sound judgments. Thi s broad definition can then provide a bridge between the differenr discussions relevant to this debate.
The first task toward understanding the feminist critique of reason is to historically situate it within the rather long tradition of critiquing reason that has existed within the mainstream of philosophy itself. Serious and sustained philosophical disc ussion concerning the scope and limits of reason is usually dated from the 18th century. Kant's Cricique of Pure Reason, after all, developed the view that reason, knowledge , and in fact philosophy itself was limited by the intellectual and perceptual attnbutesof man, that our reasoning capacity provides as much a reflection on us as a window onto the world. The epistemological problems this acknowledgment raises were solved by Kant by claiming that the world we know is not a world in itself, or a world completely indifferent to human projects and concerns, but a world constituted in part by those concerns (thus Hilary Putnam takes Kant to be the original founder of his internal realism).
In the nineteenth century, Hegel pushed this critique further to argue that knowledge and reason are also embedded within and marked by history, on the grounds that the constitutive categories identified by Kant are temporally located or indexed, and thus human knowledge is unable ever to totally surpass the horizon of its historical era. Neither philosophical puzzles nor their solutions have a timeless reach, and in fact many resol utions develop only through the historical evolution of social change. I read Marx as identifying a further fundamental qualifying condition for philosophy in material power, which he defined as forms of laboring practices, and relations of production. What this idea provided beyond Kant and Hegel was the truly revolutionary notion that philosophy could no longer be entrusted to discern and correct all of its own errors; it required external critique from other disciplines in order to reveal its ideological content.
Nietzsche and Freud of course also contributed to the undermining of the rigid demarcation between abstract reason and the desiring body, with Nietzsche arguing that the !body is the fundamental source of all human thought and argument and Freud arguing that the rational ego maintains its autonomy over an arational desire only temporarily. The Frankfurt School made another important critique of the way in which reason's reflective and critical aspects were being dismantled under the conditions of a commodity culture that performs only instrumental, or means�end, calculations. This critique might also target the minimalist account of reason, if the latter works to preclude a critical reflection on philosophy's social effects.
The fe minist critique of reason can thus be thought of as contributing to this long tradition of philosophical autocritique but adding the original dimension of sexual difference. Feminists have argued that concepts of reason and knowledge. as well as those of man, history, and power, are reflections of gendered practices passing as universal ones. The problem is nor simply that men have been biased against women's capacity to be rational, but that, at least in modernity, reason has been defined in opposition to the fe minine, such that it requires the exclusion, transcendence and even the domination of the feminine, of wom en, and of women's traditional concerns which 6
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have been characterized as rhe sire of the ITT educibly irranonal particular and corporeal.
Moreover, as Genevieve Lloyd has poinced out, "feminuury itself has been partly constituted through such prouesses of exclusto n."11 Tius is how Kane is able to make rational his claim that the woman who reasons nught as well have a beard. It is our {supposed) irrarional. incuinve, and emononal characteristics that both define us as fe male and �e us capable of affirming men's "essential" superioricy. Like any ocher concept, rati ona licy is defined by reference co some contrast, and the association between rati onality and masculinity dictated that contrascing site as the fe male.
The maj or facror in this masculinist fonnularion of reason has been mind,body dualism. From the time of Plato, reason was thought to enable the soul to reach a "'pure, and etemal...immortal and unchangeable" realm where truth dwells among the "divine ... and the wise," as Genevieve Lloyd explains. 12 "The senses, in contrast, drag the soul back to che reaJm of the changeable, where it "wanders about blindly, and becomes confused and dizzy, like a drunken man, from dealing with rhe things that are ever changing.'" To achieve knowledge, Place concluded, "the god, Like rational s.oul should rule over the slave,like mortal body." He goes so far as to claim:
We are in fact convinced that if we are ever to have pure knowledge of anything, we muse get rid of the body and contemplate things by themselves with the soul by itself. le seems, co judge from the argument, that the wisdom which we desire and upon which we profess to have set our hearts will be attainable only when we are dead, and not in our lifetime.13 The metaphysics of chis concept of reason required che control of the body, of its emot ions, desires, and everyday concerns, in order to achieve the de cached oUJtlook from which the philosopher could ascend to the plane of the universal . Such a view, in various manifestations, made its way throughout rhe hisrory of western philosophy, through Aristotle, Auguscii.ne, Aquinas, Bacon, Descartes, Rousseau, Hume, and even Kant. Though reason was portrayed as universal and neu tral precise ly because it was bodiless, chis schema worked co justify the exclusion of women from the domains of the academy, of science, and of generally being accorded epistemic authoriry and even credibility. Even. Simone de Beauvoir, writing the inaugurating treatise of western fe minise theory in this century, agreed with the claim char women were more prone to· corporeal intrusions than men, and her (in) famous solution was for women to refuse marriage and motherhood.
It is precisely because of chis legacy that Genevieve Lloyd argued in 1984 chat a fe minist project determined co gain for women the· realm of the "mind" will never work to overturn male supremacy. We cannot simply remove women from the sphere of the "body" and claim for ourselves the sphere of the "mind" and "reason" when these latter concepts have been constructed on the basis of our exclusion. Such a strategy would only participate in the violent erasure of women, cominuing the valorization of the masculine as the only gender that can achieve full humanity. Thus Lloyd warned that, "the confident affirmation that Reason 'knows no sex' may likewise be taking for realicy something which, if valid ar all, is so only as an ideal...lf there is a Reason genuinely common to all, it is so mething to be achieved in the future, nor celebrated in the present. " 14 This raises the constructive question of how to reconceptualize reason toward bringing about that universal ideal. If women are to have epistemic credibility and authority, we need to reconfigure the role of bodily experience in the development of knowledge , as well as the relationship between public and private discourse, and the primacy of the propositional over the inarticulate.15 On the other hand, if reason can no longer be segregated from bodily experience, and if sexual difference mandaces a significant distinction between male and fe male lxxl ily experiences, must we forego the goal of a universal reason? Rosi Braidotti. one of the philosophers that Lovibond critiques, suggescs that we need to "elaborate a truth which is not removed from the body, reclaiming [our) body for [ourselves) ... [We need]\ to develop aad transmit a critique which respects and bears the trace of the intensive, libidinal force that sustains it. " 1 6 Given the irremediable material reality of sexual difference. can we universali:e the body to which truth is always connected? This is just the sort of question that makes Nussbaum think feminist philosophy is embracing the irrational. For Braidoni, the radical problems in the canon require correspondingly radical responses. But Nussbaum calls chis blaming of the philosophical tradi1tion for patriarchal ideas a &ench,inspired (read: implausible) reduction of reasoned discourse to "the play of social and political forc es." Nussbaum argues that fe mini st philosophers fallaciously conclude from the fact that "the philosophical tradition has existed alongside patriarchal and oppressive institu'tions" that philosophy is co blame for these "abuses." 1 7 Given this view, for Nussbaum the history of philosophy provides no mo tivati on for such radical revisions as Braidotti is willing to entertain.
I will address Nussbaum's concern about the "french,inspired" fe minist reduction of philosophy to ideology in a moment, but it should be clear from the synopsis I gave above that the canon is not attributed blame by fe minists simply because it existed alongside patriarchy, but because patriarchal ideas are found rife within. It is interesting to compare the canonical quotes I lifted to the ones Nussbaum uses in her essay to support her claims about the usefulness of the canon precisely for feminism: she cites Mill's argument for women's liberation, Plato's against the use of convention to maintain women's exclusion from sports, and Aristotle's emphasis on the role of emotion in pracrical reasoning. These are all genuinely positive examples, while mine were all negative. Which of these secs of examples represent the canon's fundamental essence? The unchallenged position on this when I was in school was that those embarrassing ruminations on women's inferiority and slaves' slavishness and so on that one would inevitably come :across in philosophers' as diverse as Augustine and Kierkegaard represented relative trivialities, asides rather than central theses, and thus were unrepresentative of the thrust of western philosophical thought .. This explanation then justified the fact that these passages lay unattended to, passed over in class except perhaps to joke about in ways that were usually discomforting (as if painful sexism was simply funny) , but never examined for their relationship to the central ideas of the text.
What much of fe minist philosophy has argued is that there is an intrinsic rel ationship, as Lloyd has amply demonstrated, between these sexist asides and the main account given of reason as well as the predominance of mind,body dualism and other dominant themes in the history of philosophy. To acknowledge this does not encourage a book burning party, nor does it in any way prohibit us from mining the canon for the counter themes as N ussbaum suggests. But it does justify just such a thorough and comprehensive critique of the canon as fe minist philosophers have initiated. Before we blithely announce that the tradition is more often than not friendly to anti;sexist thought, we needJ a careful interrogation of what it contains, and this critical project is still in its initial stages.18
However, I agree with Nussbaum on a very important point, whi ch i s that feminist philosophy cannot entirely forego the recourse to reason, obj ectivity, and truth. A collapse of knowledge to ideology or a refusal to characterize the source of the epistemic authority and privilege of one's own claims is only an avoidance of the implicit 8
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 26 [1996] of Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz. Lovibond offers a more accurate charactenzanon of the general critique of reason as caused by the "confromauon becween the thmking subject and the fact of hLS own rnatenally condmoned status.".?C And she is more inclined than Nussbaum ro rec ogmze the seriousness of chis confrontanon and its deep phiilosoph1cal implications. Nussbaum, by contrast, thmk.s reason is fi ne as it is except for the denigration of emotioru, but she neglects to explore whether the denigration of emotions is connected co fundame ntal aspects of the standard account of rationality. However, while Lovibond takes seriously the need for critique, she distinguishes between cwo ways to go abouc such a critique--one reformisc and one radical-and argues that the Lauer cannot avoid self�con tradiction and irracionalism. These categories, of the reformist and the radical fe mini st position on reason (and on philosophy) are originally developed in Braidocci's Patcem.s of Dissonance (and to some extent also correspond to the distinction Nussbaum lifts from Plato concerning women who hate philosophy and women who love ir). According, then, to both lovibond and Braidotti, the reformist position avoids "an all-0ut attack on 'rationality' and relaced concepts, preferring instead to engage in local, piecemeal critical enquiries into the effects of the sexual power structure on philosophy ... ", and is associated with the work of Lorraine Code, Genevieve Lloyd, and Michele LeDoeuff. 21 The radical position, by contrast, has given up trying to correct or improve reason because it sees reason as fu ndamentally flawed by its "complicity with the sexual power structure.,,22 This position argues instead for the replacement of reason by a feminine symbolic, and can be found in the work of Braidotti herself, Elizabeth Grosz (and, I would think, Luce lrigaray) .
The fundamental argument for the radical over the reformist position, according co Lovibond, i s that the reformist naively believes reason can be perfected, that the limits a material context and embodied subject places on reason can be overcome, as if with enough therapy we could eventually achieve complete self-knowledge and eliminate all unconscious influences. Given the fu tility of this goal, Lovibond reads Braidotti as holding that no progress is possible, that is, no progress in an epistemic or rational sense. The insight of psychoanalysis (which heavily informs Braidotti's approach) is that a cohe·rent self is an impossibility. and co the extent that reason assumes that we can at lease potentially know what we are doing and that we can subject both our practices and our beliefs to self-correcting reasoned critique, reason is itself based on a mi staken ontology.
Lovibond criticiles Braidotti for this view by pointing out all the places in Braidotti's text where she appeals to coherence, legitimacy, faulty reasoning, and even the recalcitrance of reality in her critique of the reformist positions. Braidotti's rejection of reformism explains why she never attempts to reconstruct notions of truth, justification, and normativity, a problem Lovibond suggests is thematic i n fe minist philosophy. If no progress is thought to be possible in a rational or epi stemic sense, then such projects of reconstruction are a waste of time.
On this point I would agree with what I take to 'be Lovibond's position that fe minists or anyone else are mistaken who believe that epistemic and normative reconstructions are impossible once we let go of foundationali sm and essentialism and acknowledge that we will always be both "conditioned and free. There is no question that these are methodologically conservative works, and I will even admit that that is part of their attraction for me: they are careful, detailed, not grandiose in their claims, doing their utmost to prod uce a productive dialogue with the traditions (in epistemology and philosophy of science). On the other hand, I also find myself delighting in and even in fundamental agreement with the most radical feminist texts: Braidotti1s1 Grosz's, lrigaray's. These authors are much less concerned about dialoguing with the dominant traditions in philosophy, much more likely to castigate the whole canon as inherently phallocentric, and they justify their irreverence on the grounds that we need to develop (precisely as Lovibond quotes Braidotti) a feminine symbolic.
So am I incoherent? Is this perhaps explainable on the psychological level that I truly believe in reasoned argument and empirical evidence but find the irreverent attacks more therapeutic or cathartic in expressing my "unreasoned female rage"? I shy from that conclusion (indeed, it makes me anxious) . I believe char the distinction between these two groups which would imply their fundamental incompatibility, especially on the question of reason, is unfounded, and I also believe that the imputation of incompatibility is connected to the separation Plato made between philosophy and rhetoric. Before I explain thi s please be clear that I am not arguing a defense of all and any claims made by the feminists I have mentioned, or thac all and any of their various positions can be made consistent with each other. On some points I disagree with all of them. Nor is my aim simply to smooth over internal fe minist differences so that we can all be friends.25 Rather, what I am arguing for is a way to understand the broad contours of a fe minise critique of reason as a coherent and defensible re search program, which is different than a particular theoretical commitment.
Remember, aher all, the passage from Lloyd I quored earlier:
"the conf1denc aff irmati on thac Reason 'knows no sex' may hkew�se be cahng for rea11ry somethll1g which. J valid ac all. is so only as an ideal.. .If there is a Reason genuinely common to all, H tS somethm.g to be adueved in the future, not celebrated in the present. ":6 These are not the words of someone who believes that reason is basteally fme as Hi s currently conceived, nor of someone who holds that progress LS i n evicable. Racher. che passage implies the position that the dominanc understanding of reason needs fu ndamencal critique and rraosformation, very far from Nussbaum's attempt to protect reason as the tool beyond which there is no appeal and without which the forces of oppression cannot be held off.
Moreover, look again at the passage I quoted from Braidotti: How are women to elaborate a truth which is not removed from the body, reclaiming their body for themselves? How are women to develop and rrarum�t a critique which respects and bears the trace of the intensive , libidinal force chac sustains ic? What must women do to keep truth nor ossifi ed but alive ?27 Braidotci does not shrink here from using the word truth or articulating a project chat involves epistemic progress, that is, the elaboration of a .. truer truth", a more representative truth, for wome n. There is no question chac Lloyd and Braidotci wrice differenrly, chink diff erencly, and hold significancly diffe rent posirions on, for example, psychoanalysis, postscructuralism, and ocher significant philosophical issues. But this makes the question of how to understand their commonalities all the more intriguing to try and answer.
Toward answering chis, first we might note that a radical approach to critique, or the determination to subject every element of reason to criticism, is not itself irrational. On the contrary, che unwillingness ro engage ins uch a. radical critique as a matter of principle is a form of dogmatism. There are, however, serious problems chat such a fundamental critique must address. If reason is fu ndamentally and irretrievably patriarchal, what can replace it other than arationaliry? And what is the rational status of the critique itself: isn'rt it caught within a debilitating circularity of using reason against itself? These problems are neither compelling nor unique co fe mini se work: they have beset every proj ect of critique from Kant through to the Frankfurt School. It might take another paper to adequately explore them, but if we dispense with the incommensurabilicy thesi s they immediately appear much less serious. That is, no critique of reason can actually understand itself as ope rating from completely outside the traditions of rational discourse. To some extent, therefore, all such critiques will be immanent, which di spenses with the need to show that one is appealing to strategies of legitimation entirely outside reason unless one is championing aracionalicy.
Alasdair Macintyre, working very much within the Western Aristotelian traditions that both Nussbaum and Lovibond prize, has developed an account of rationality as essentially historical and socially concext,bound which can make sense of the fe minist critique. In Whose Justice! Which Rationality? Macintyre endeavors to make sense of the fact that every set of cognitive standards emerge from and are a part of a particular social history, and chat they inescapably gain their legitimation precisely from this context, in their ability to "transcend the limitations and provide remedies for the defects of their predecessors within the history of that same tradition. "28 This sort of historicist meta, philosophy, or historicist account oflegitimation, is today a position considered reasonable within philosophy of science (Lakatos) and even influential within epistemologies of the ls che Frourusc Crinque of Reason Rarional! social sciences. Ab.solute relanvism, the collapse of truth co ideolom . and che repudiation of all reasoned appeals do nor follow from a htSroricisc account, since. as I have been arguing, to locate an epistemology or a concept of reason in a social history i(and rhus.
following Maclnryre, co understand it as a tradition) is not to say that it cannot unde·rstand or communicate \\rich other traditions, that it shares no common ground ";th them upon which it can criticize their positions or learn from them how its own positions are limited. Nor does it follow that nothing we say represents the real.
What does follow is that reason is not timeless, and that we cannoc d i s miss out ofhand an external critique which would explore the threads of connection between a social context like patriarchy and colonialism and the epistemic systems that grew ouc of this soil. If epistemologies are legitimated through their ability co provide remedies for currently existing problems, we need co explore what problems Enlightenment epistemologies sol.ved, and we need to be prepared co look beyond the explicit content of the canonical debates over knowledge to see the social and political contexts in which these debates became so imponanc and so influential. Given this convergence between fe minise critique and other critique and explorations of the limitations of reason, such as in Macintyre 's weU,respected work, one begins to won der why fe minists have been singled ouc for their/our disloyalty to the tradition. In order to answer this we are led w a second point that would be helpful in underscanding the consistency between the reformi st and radical wing of che feminise cririque. If we must begin to acknowledge that forms of rationality (this is the type of wording Macintyre counsels, in order co signify the plurality and variability of reasons) are embedded within history, we must also acknowledge that reasoned argument is only a part of whac is contained in ours or any other philosophical writings. What I am referring to here is che need co repair che Philosophy/Rhetoric split we all intoned in grad uate school as the primary legitimation for philosophy, chat is, philosophy's distinctiveness fr om and superiority over writing which aims primarily to persuade, which appeals to emotion, which supplants aesthetic for logical criteria, or which conceals from view its ideol.ogical content or overriding strategic aim. My suspicion is that it is this part of our tradition that most philosophers will have trouble critiquing, for ic is just this part that Braidocti openly contests and thac Lovibond believes can be relinquished only at chc peril of our profess ion. And moreove r, I would argue that it is this aspect of the feminist critique of reason which is most "gendered" in that it threatens mi nd, body dualism and endangers the self,understanding of philosophy as a fonn of manly control (with control over) the forces of emotion, desire, and power associated historically with an essentially chaotic and female nature.
The canonical demarcation between philosophy and rhetoric turned on the issue of truth. On Plato's account, rhetoric merely delivers a truth that has already been discovered; ic cannot itself contribute to the discovery of truth. Thus it is style without substance, an inessential and of t en obfuscating dress lain over the truth substance which philosophical argument achieves. And as a fonn of dress, or even fashion, rhetoric comes in for all of Plato's criticisms of seductive practices aimed at deceit assoc iated strongly although not exclusively with women. Indeed, as Susan Jarratt has shown, when men attempt to manipulate language toward the goal of persuasion-as in rhetorical oratory-they bring themselves down co the level of women who manipulate their external appearance coward the goal of seduction. 29 In both cases, the enchanting surface appearance conceals a process of manipulation and of t en further conceals the tru ch, i.e. , the "real" appearance of the woman or the "real" epistemic status of the claims 12
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 26 [1996] This accounc actually presents us with rwo ways ro understand the relationship of rhetonc to truth. To the extent that rhetoric is merely a delivery of already discovered truth, it adds nothing co the philosophical enterprise of truth see king. To che ,excenc char rhetoric worlc.s to persuade through deception, it is an obstacle to philosophy that must be sharply discredited and exposed. In both cases, it is entirely distinct from philosophy.
Needless to say, Plaro's contemporanes who were engaged in rhetonc held a different view of the nature of their discursive practice. For the Sophists. rhetoric was not merely sryle without substance, buc the accual means to truth, which they defined differently than Plato. Famously for Plaro, truth referred co a realm entirely rran.scendenc of the human realm, transcendent of the temporality and changeableness that material reality cannot esca(k. For the Sophi.st.s, on the other hand, truth is the outcome of human perception and discourse, and is established through disputation. In contrast co Plato's transcendental conception of truth, the Sophist'.s conception suggests an immanent, non-absolute definition of truth. JO The Sophistic epistemologic.al claims about the intrinsic relationship between discourse and truth can find resonance in contemporary ,consensus theories of truth (Peirce, Habermas) and philosophies of science that locate che scientific communiry as the final arbiter over scientific truth claims (Kuhn) . The ontology of truth to which these theories are committed is not necessarily anci-reali st. Understanding truth as immanent relocates the reference of truth claims to a fully contextualized material reality rather than a decontexruaJized transcendent realm. Putnam's internal realism may be the most f u lly developed account of such a view that explains (successfully, in my opinion) why it deserves the title .. realist.
"11
However, my main interest in the Sophist's claims about truth for this paper does not concern these epi stemological and metaphysical issues so much as the metaphilosophical issues raised by the claim that rhetoric is necessarily a part of truth�seeking discourse. I will try to flesh these issues out and then turn to see how they are developed in some works of fe minist philosophy.
As Dilip Pararneshwar Gaonkar has explained, "the 'rhetorical turn' refers to the growing recognition of rhetoric in contemporary thought .. .lt means that the special sciences are becoming increasingly rhetorically self-conscious. They are beginning to recognize that their discursive practices, both internal and external, contain an unavoidable rhetorical content. "32 Gaonkar warns against overestimating the scope of rhetoric, or overvalui ng rhetoric as the ground of discourse. But he agrees with Derrida that even if we take Plato's point that rhetoric is always only a supplemem: rather than the ground of discourse, the !history of this supplement may be of more ultimate interest "than the history of that which i s in need of a supplement.1133
What happens if philosophy were to become more rhetorically self-conscious? What would this mean for philosophy's pursuit of truth as its highest aim? Dominick LaCapra has offered a usef u l discussion of this related issue for history, which is also a tru th,seeking discipline, showing that an incorporation of rhetorical understanding is not in necessary contradiction to history's overarching concern for truth. Rhetoric involves a dialogical understanding of discourse and of "truth" itself in contrast to a monological idea of a unifi ed authorial voice providing an ideally exhaustive and definitive (total) account of a fuUy mastered object 13 ls the Fenurusc Cruique of Reason Rauonal! of knowledge .... che concept of che dialogical situates thac of persuasion m a larger discursive context. �'ichin this contexc, a .. convt:-rsation'' wich the past involves rhe hisrorian in argument and even polemic-both w1rh others and within rhe self--over approaches co understanding rhat are bound up wirh institutional and polmcal i s sues. }4 Within philosophy, Gadame r's philosophical hermeneuc1cs offers 1usc such a d1alogical model of truth. Here, rhe positivi st model of knowing in which an acrivc knowing agent confronts a passive object is reconceptualized as a conversation berween participants all of whom have their own horizon or interpreti,·e perspective. Textual documents and objects of knowledge, to the extent they are delimited and idenufied as objects of knowledge through historical processes of inq uiry, carry forth their own horizons of meaning. Knowing, then, requires not so much the discovery of a pri st ine face but the fusion of horizons into a maximally comprehensive and coherent whole.
On this conversational or dialogical model (whkh may well involve more than rwo participants), a rhetorical self-consciousness leads. us back to the sophistic account of truth. If truth is the contingent product (that is, within history rather chan transcendent of history) of an incerpretive, dialogical process, it becomes easier co see how rhetoric can contribute to the attainment of truth rather than being an inessential or olbfuscating supplement. If truth is understood as the product of an argument (involving cwo or more participants), then all the contributing elements of that argument need to be analyzed within an epistemological characterization of its results.
The major shift involved here is a localization of truch to a specific context and away from a transcendental, ahistorical model. And chis has been the stumbling block to understanding both the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy and berween reason and the body. How can rhetoric, even when it is understood on the Aristotelian model as a science that is attentive co the particular, material context of debate, contribute to the attainment of a philosophical truth defined by its transcendence of that context? Jarratt suggests that the sophistic ontology of truth is based on a kind of materialist anthropology rather than a metaphysi.cs. By this she means that truth is contingent on the relations of knowers as these are constituted within a particular, material context, not in the sense that the content of the truth claim may be about these relations, but in the sense that the truth,status of any claim cannot transcend this particular context. In rhetoric , the knower makes arguments, or moves in the language game, based on her assessment of its likely effects on her particular interlocutors or co, discussants. In philosophy, traditionally understood, we are not supposed to aim at persuasion as the highest good, but at truth. To misunderstand the distinction (a distinction which exists in principle even if not always in fact) between a persuasive argument and a valid argument is to risk distorting the truth seeking process. But if truth is nor separable from the dialogical process within which it emerges, then the rules of philosophical argument and of conversational argument (or persuasion) begin to merge. For example, we might want to take into account the background of our partner in dialogue in terms of expressing meaning, knowing that the meaning s/he will hear through our words will partly be affected by her or his own horizon of in terpreta ti on. And to the extent meaning is connected to truth, this process will not be irrelevant to assessing either the justification or truth,status of our claims.
A further point of conjuncture LaCapra highlights between rhetoric and history is likewise relevant for philosophy. This involves the question of reading texts. He notes the tendency of professional historians to see texts as documents in the narrow sense of the word and, by the same token, to ignore the textual 14
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 26 [1996] , No. 1, Art. 1 http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol26/iss1/1 d111lens1onsof documents chemselves, that i.s, the manner m wh1chdocumentS "process " or rework matenal m ways mrtmacely bound up with larger sociocultural and political processes ... Nor are we inclined to raise the more "rheconcal" quesuon of how texts do whac they do--how, for example, they may sicuace or frame whac they "represent"' or inscribe (social dLScourses, paradigms, generic conventions, stereotypes, and so forth). The mulc1ple roles of tropes, irony, parody, and other .. rhe1torica1" devices of composition and arrangement generate resistances to the consrrual of texts in cerrns of their "representati onal" or narrowly documentary fu nctions, and they disclose how texts may have critical or even potenually transformative relations co phenomena "represented" in them. l)
The philosophical canon is disanalogous from the cype of hiscorical documents LaCapra is referring co here, documents such as census reports, legal transcripts, birth records, and so forth. And yet our canon is none theless rife with the rhetorical devices LaCapra lists as well as with che multiple relati onships ro their purported representational content. These elements wilJ not be revealed by an exclusive aetencion co a texes propos itional claims, but will need an attentiveness also to its choice of metaphor, imagery, co nventions, ecc., all of which may suggest a subtext that may or may not conform to the explicit argument of the essay. And these are not asides co a philosophical dispensarion of che text, but crucial co understanding its full meanirlg, its dominant interpretations and persuasive effect, even to its canonization.
In The Philosophical Imaginary, Michele LeDoeuff explores several canonical philosophical texts for whac she calls cheir textual unconscious. Philosophy defines itself by a contrast precisely to the rhetorical devices LaiCapra mentions as well as to images, poetry, myths, and fables. When these appear irl philosophical rexes, they are said co be there only for embellishment, for illustration of a claim rather than standing for a claim itself. However, LeDoeuff argues, and succeeds in showing, that philosophy cannot do without these elements: they spring up constantly as unsupported premises, and prop up other premises in the text, creating a kind of repressed and unsayable textual unconscious to which LeDoeuff means to refer by the concept of the philosophical imaginary. Thus, the philosophical imaginary is constituted by a set of images central to the fu nctioning of philosophy that it cannot itself acknowledge . This, she suggests, is the shameful or inadequate face of philosophy: its inability to reflect on its own modes of discourse. Philosophy projects che imaginary as either ics precondition-the primitive, the child, or the infantile which exists prior to philosophical thought-or as its pedagogic device ics means co translate philosophical conclusions for an untrained audience. Thus it attempts co dominate the whole field of theory and non,theory: it recognizes the existence of non,theory but considers itself in charge of assessing non, theory as well as the master of theory. But on LeDoeuff s account, the philosophical imaginary, which can be ascertained in any given philosophical text, represents desire and affect, over which philosophy can never gain total control. Her view is not that philosophy is reducible to desire, but that philosophy is inextricably bound up with desire.
The specific form chat the philosophical imaginary will take for any given specific text arises from four elements: ( 1) the internal needs of the particular philosophical enterprise; (2) the psychical needs of philosophers and their readers; (3) the sociologica l, i.e., historical and cultural, context; and (4) the trajectory of images in a historical succession of texts, that reveal a text's debt to other sources. Thus, the philosophical imaginary does philosophical work, in developing, justifying and clarifyin g an argument and not simply delivering it. The imagery of a text works to justify premi ses that the explicit philosophical 15 argument cannot justify.
ls che Femm LSt Criuque of Reason Rational! Thus, LeDoeuff disputes the norion that these subtextual elements are simply the expression of a "primitive soul" or "pre-c ultural, pre-historical desire,, which commentators from Jung to Paglia have believed co be operative within philosophy. Rather, on LeDoeuff s account, the philosophical imaginaf)' "copes "irh problems posed by the cheoretical enterprise itself' and thus cannot be characterized as something essentially other-than-philosophy.
LeDoeuff s most compelling reading is of Thomas More's Utopia, which she interprets th.rough a foc us on More's choice of the island as a metaphor for a utopian sociery. This island imagery reveals that More's vision is not in fact a political vision: it is a vision of self#sufficiency, of independence, without external influence or engagement. It is thus an insular utopia, a solitary, non-objec t-related introversion, where the pleasure i s a pleasure of undisturbed tranquiliry, what she names a primary narcissism. The island of ucopia is like the mirage of individual autonomy, where the "free" individual is completely alone, with its umbilical cord (to the isthmus) cue. This is not a policies: there is no theory of external relations, nor even of fr iendship. The version of utopia thus produced has total closure, a closure maximized inversely to the elimination of social relations. Thus, LeDoeuffs reading produces an inversion of More's own vision from utopia to dystopia. I want to suggest that this reading is not outside the domain of reasoned analysis. Reading More's Utopia through a foc us on its metaphors and imagery is not the only way to read the text, nor does LeDoeuff argue that hers is the privileged reading. Bue it is one approach to mining the content of the cext that philosophy has traditionally castigated as irrelevant. And it reveals that the traditional segregation between rhetoric and philosophy is a delusion.
Neither science nor philosophy works entirely through logical entailments between factually based claims. Part of the way in which models and hypotheses are judged as worthy of experimental pursuit or philosophical plausibiliry involves coherence, analogy, and metaphor. And surely the most ubiquitous metaphor of all involves gender. Even in English, which does nor gender its nouns in the way that frenc h and spanish do, there are many gendered associations: mother earth, boats, ships and hurricanes are female , as is the sea, justice, and so on. And there are dozens of cliche phrases in the academy such as ''the penetrating argument," "the thrust of an argument," a "rigorous critique," "erect a deferue," a "seminal work." These phrases work precisely in the way LeDoeuff suggescs in so far as they invoke unsupported premises that work to offer supporc for other premises in the text. If one is in doubt that phallocentrism exists, one need only read Saul Kripke, for whom the ulcimate, fixed, and essential meanings of words are always determined by what he calls "rigid designators."
As Eva Feder Kittay explains, metaphors help to elucidate meaning through making an association between two different thingsi they thus perform an act of mediation, which changes the term thus mediated. 36 Hegel argued that, in the master slave dialectic, the slave's subjectivity is mediated through labor, that in creating a new objecc a new serue of self is produced in the slave. Moreover, the slave's recognition of the master's status as master mediates the master's own sense of self, and thus the master's relation to himself. De Beauvoir carried this idea forward to male/female relations: a man is made to fe el stronger, larger, more intelligent, when paired with a relatively smaller, weaker, dependent woman. In this way mediation transforms the self, and gender dimorphism is selected for in the species.
Metaphors in language can also perform such an act of mediation, by structuring an unstructured conceptual domain. When we say of a fashion "it's hot" we transfer the 16
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 26 [1996] , No. 1, Art. 1 semantic re lat i ons berween hot and cold to those between clothing sryles. When we say of an argument that it is seminal, penetrating or ngorous we transfer the semantic relations between masc uline potency and impotence or between having an erecti on and being flaccid. The concept of woman mediates the relations between man and his ochers--orher men, nature, his own self. This is noc a reciprocal relation: women are defined in reference to men, as helpmeets, wives, mothers, caregivers of men. Men are not: defined to the same extent by their relations to wome n. Thus men do not figure as metaphors 50 ofcen. Kiccay has developed a cypology of such gendered metaphors: ( 1) Fi rst, man locates himself in his domain in relationship to woman in her domain, but always according a greater value to the male activity. Thus Socrates the philosopher portrays himself as a midwife, but bringing forth universal truths rather than particular babies. (2) Second, man locates himself in his object world through a relation to wome n. Thus the city of Babylon is said to be the great whore, there for man's delight and temptation, and nature is, of course, a woman, trying to hide her secrets under her skirts. (3) And third, and most obvious, woman mediates the relationships between men, establishing their status vis,a,vis other men; the beautiful model on the arm of a high powered man is there for other men to see. Gang rape establishes bonds between men via the domination and subjugation of a woman.
Kittay concludes from this that woman's usefulness as metaphor depends on the difference and lesser status of our activiti es. Our empowerment and our equal panicipation in male domains will make us less useful for the mediating function. In part I bring this up to flesh out some of the ways in which models and metaphors which carry political implications work withi n inquiry to make arguments persuasive, hypotheses plausible, and to provide a coded discourse which can make us comfortable (or not) with other inquirers. Kiuay's analysis also can help us understand why what might appear as trivial linguistic conventions (the subject of what today is called the pc wars) can have significant political meaning and effects. 37 Coherentist procedures of inquiry are neither arational nor unsusceptible to ideologically informed analogical arguments, such as those that Hnk beliefs about efficient methods of managing workers and master molecule theories, or between the patriarchal belief that there must be one ultimate head of a household and mono-causal genetic explanati ons ofbehavior. To make such connections is not to imply that reason is useless, but that we need much more complex accounts of how reason works. We need to learn to read on more than one level, to pay attention to language, imagery, metaphor, to do the kind of readings that both LeDoeuff and lrigaray (presumably on opposite sides of the reformist,conservative split) excel at, and that Andrea Nye provides in her hitstory of logic.38 As Nye says, such readings are not the whole story, and a reductionism to the "play of social and politi cal forces" is not the conclusion. Bue these readings are a part of the story about reason and truth which we have left aside in our manly refusal to acknowledge the significance of a texts'' inevitable emotional and aesthetic elements. Braidotti reaches this conclusion through a psychoanalysis of philosophy itself. The argument is basically this: Traditional rationalism's declared supremacy over emotion and desire parallels the ego's attempt to wrest control over the unconscious. The illusion of the coherent, ego-dominant, rational subject depends on its ability to segregate and gain control over its irrati onal internal sibling; the ego must reign over the unconscious, the rational must reign over emotion and desire, and the mind must reign over the body. In the west at least, these associations became gendered, so that rationality required male dominance over women. Permeable borders between the rational and irrational 17 ls the Femirust Critique of Reason Rationa l! components of a subject, or a text, threaten the very possibility of racional control. Nussbaum, on my S)mptomatic readmg, would have us reincorporate emotion within our understanding of rati onality, but after having done this her basic strategy would be co pronounce reason sufficiently degendered and universal. and once again in control. Why isn't this acceptable? For one thing, the narrative of opposition with the dark forces of corporealiry is likely co be reinscribed through another identity marker so that reason can retain its supremacist self,image; e.g., through whiteness, such that irrational. superstitious, "traditional" cultures are portrayed as the cenrral site of a discourse controlled by desire and myth against logic and truth. This scenario is of couTSe already in place, but the suggestion is that gender can be disentangled from modernist narratives about reason with the result of exempting white Anglo women only from the realm of the irrational abject. We need a larger analysis.
Braidorti understands the modernist narrative associating reason and philosophy as ultimately founded on power.39 Thus, her critique of reason is chat it mistakenly represents itself as undetermined by power when in actuality the entire discourse i s the linguistic enactment of an exclusionary hegemony enabled through violent agonistics structured and concealed under the gui se of reason and logic. In this, Lovibond is right co point out chat Braidocti is appealing even to representational truth in her claim co know better than traditi onal philosophy what its discourse is actually about.
But if Lovibond is right that Braidot ti i s still appealing to reason, this fact docs not disprove Braidottil's claim that it is not possible to :seek a theoretical discourse that will stand completely outside of power, that will enforce no exclusions and concain no elements having to do with desire and the will to maximize one's own sphere of effectiveness. To seek such a theory outside of power is a metaphysical mistake as well as the wrong political and epistemic aim: any discourse needs a true/false distinction.
Given this, the better alternative is to reconfigure the relationship between power and theory, between the ego and the unconscious, between reason and its others, to acknowledge the instability of these categories and the permeability of their borders, and to develop a reconstructed notion of reason not as a mastery of an ego over the whole, but as including multiple forms and operating on many levels. Thi s project is incorreccly interpreted as a reductionism of reason to unreason: it does not give unreason the total mastery. Bue it also rejects the zero,sum game of the law of non,contradiction or the mutual exclusiveness between corporeal power and desire and incorporeal rationality. Rationality does not need the manichaean epistemic ontology of an absolute truth, mastery over an abject unreason. It needs distinctions, between true and false, more and less rational, but these can be formulated differently through developing an account of the situatedness of truth and reason.
I conclude therefore that the work of the radical fe minists contributes to thi s project of reformulating reason by teaching us to read differently, to analyze logical relations between propositions alongside the silent invocatiions of word choice and the implicit arguments advanced by metaphor. They help us to develop a simultaneous attentiveness to the emotional content of a text alongside its surface pronouncements, without eliminating either from efficacy over meaning. This is how I would understand the coherence between the approaches that both Braidotti and Lovibond want to separate as reformi st and radical: I see both as contributing to a reconstructed reason, internally heterogeneous in form and organizing principle, free from the defensive need to purify itself from corporeal intrusions heretofore known as sophistry, rhetoric, and emotion. Both of the so,called reformists and radicals are teaching us to read differently, as Annette Baier suggested we read Locke differently 18
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 26 [1996] 14The true contrary to epistemic absolutism, or the belief that there is one set of epistemic standards to which all claims must answer, i s not relativism. As many have pointed out, relativism and this sort of absolutism aTe correlates, not true contraries. It is the (hopeless) quest for absolutism that leads to a defeated relativism, and relativism itself (in its absolute or radical form)
actually presupposes an absolute and neutral frame of reference from which
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